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Abstract
The evidence for belief-based guilt aversion is reviewed with a par-
ticular focus on trust games and dictator games. By way of compar-
ison an alternative model to belief-based guilt aversion is proposed
which is based on an internalized norm. We show that the experimen-
tal evidence to date is consistent with belief-based guilt aversion but
that it is difficult to distinguish one model from another. The review
compares the many different approaches that have been used to elicit
beliefs. It also looks at the role of exposure and communication.
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The basic idea behind belief-based guilt aversion is that a person feels guilt
if they believe they have let down the payoff expectations of another. For
instance, someone who does not fulfill a contract may feel guilt if they believe
the other party to the contract expected the contract would be fulfilled. A
general model of belief-based guilt aversion was formally introduced by Batti-
galli and Dufwenberg (2007), drawing on prior work developed for a range of
specific contexts (e.g. Huang and Wu 1994, Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000,
Dufwenberg 2002, Guerra and Zizzo 2004 and Charness and Dufwenberg
2006).1 There have now been a large number of papers providing exper-
imental evidence for and against the belief-based model’s predictions (e.g.
Vanberg 2008, Ellingsen et al. 2010, Kawagoe and Narita 2014). So what, if
anything, have we learnt so far? That’s the question I attempt to answer in
this paper.
In order to review the evidence on guilt aversion I first propose a model
of guilt that can be readily compared with the belief-based model. To put
this contribution in context it is important to recognize that the belief-based
model of guilt aversion, proposed by Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007), is
widely applicable. For instance, it can used to study guilt from free-riding on
the production of a public good (Dufwenberg, Gächter and Hennig-Schmidt
2011), guilt from over-charging for a credence good (Beck et al. 2013) or guilt
from lying (Battigalli, Charness and Dufwenberg 2013). It is no surprise that
a model as widely applicable as this does not always perfectly predict what
we observe in the lab. The interesting question is whether some other model
can capture aspects of guilt that the belief-based model cannot.
The alternative model that I shall consider is similar to that discussed
by Lopez-Perez (2010) and sees guilt as arising from deviation from some
internalized norm. In narrowing down what norm means I will follow the
approach of Andrighetto, Grieco and Tummolini (2015) in distinguishing be-
tween empirical and normative expectations. In a model based on empirical
conformity a person’s guilt is relative to what they believe the ‘average per-
son’ in their situation would do. For instance, someone feels guilt from not
fulfilling a contract if they believe the ‘average’ person would fulfill the con-
tract. In a model based on normative beliefs a person’s guilt is relative to
1This prior work used terms like remorse (Huang and Wu 1994), letting down (Dufwn-
berg and Gneezy 2000) or shame (Guerra and Zizzo 2004) but the underlying ideas are
similar. Dufwenberg (2002) explicitly talks of belief-dependent guilt.
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what they think someone in their situation ‘ought to do’. In this case the
person feels guilt if they believe that fulfilling the contract is the right thing
to do.
To illustrate the models and the differences between them consider the
following example. Ann has employed Brian to do a job. Brian’s effort,
measured in time, is unobservable and so there is an incentive for him to shirk.
Suppose that Brian believes the right thing to do is work for 30 minutes, that
the average person would work for 20 minutes and (he believes) Ann only
expects him to work for 10 minutes. If Brian works for 10 minutes then he will
feel guilt according to empirical conformity and normative beliefs, because
he has put in less effort than his reference level, but would not feel guilt
according to the belief-based model, because he has behaved consistent with
what he believes Ann was expecting. The key point of departure between
the models is that in the belief-based model Brian is focused on what Ann
expects while in the reference-based model he is focused on what the average
person does or what he thinks is the right thing to do.2
Having briefly introduced the different models of guilt I shall look back
in detail through key experimental findings in order to evaluate the evidence
for and against belief-based guilt aversion. A particular focus shall be given
to the trust game introduced by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). In short,
I shall argue that both the belief-based and reference-based models appear
consistent with the available evidence. This is not to say that all the evidence
is supportive of both models, it clearly is not; but there is no piece of evidence
so compelling that it justifies ruling out one model over the other (or rejecting
both). It is, though, worth highlighting that in many settings the belief-based
and reference-based models give identical predictions. For instance, if Brian
and Ann know nothing about each other then Brian’s beliefs of what Ann
expects should coincide with his beliefs about what the ‘average person’ does.
To better distinguish between models we will need, therefore, to consider new
experimental designs.3 The concluding discussion offers some suggestions in
2In the example, Ann expects less than Brian’s internalized norm but things can clearly
go the other way. For instance, if Brian believes that Ann is expecting 50 minutes work
then by working for 30 minutes he would feel guilt according to the belief-based model
but not with empirical conformity or normative beliefs.
3The psychology and sociology literature have a lot to say on the meaning of guilt
(see Lopez-Perez 2010 for a review). If we decide that guilt is an emotion a person
experiences when they let down the expectations of others then one could argue, as a
matter of semantics, that the belief-based model is the correct one. In economics, the
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this regard.
Before we begin the analysis let me emphasize that comparing between
models is not a zero-sum game. In particular, I will point to the benefits of
a hybrid approach that combines elements of both the reference-based and
belief-based models. The idea that behavior is driven by multiple factors is
not novel (e.g. Dufwenberg et al. 2011, Battigalli, Charness and Dufwenberg
2013). But, the interaction between different factors opens up new possibil-
ities. To illustrate the point consider again the Ann and Brian example
where Brian’s internalized norm is 30 minutes of work and he believes that
Ann expects 50 minutes. Brian could interpret the high expectation of Ann
as unreasonable and, therefore, feel no guilt from disappointing those expec-
tations. Or, Brian could interpret the high expectation of Ann as a signal she
considers him trustworthy and so feel relatively more guilt from disappoint-
ing her expectations. Importantly, in both these scenarios it is the difference
between the internalized norm and Ann’s expectation that matters.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 a theoretical background is
provided in which models of guilt are introduced and compared. In Sections
3 and 4 a survey is provided of the experimental evidence on guilt, with a
particular emphasis on trust and dictator games. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical Preliminaries
To focus the discussion I will consider a simple example. Let me empha-
size that my objective in doing so is to set the scene for a review of the
experimental evidence and so the analysis will be rudimentary. For a more
detailed look at the theory behind the belief-based model of guilt aversion see
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007, 2009), Khalmetski, Ockenfels and Werner
(2015), Attanasi, Battigalli and Manzoni (2016) and Attanasi, Battigalli and
Nagel (2016). Note also that I shall focus, as is standard in the experimental
literature (e.g. Charness and Dufwenberg 2006), on an individual level anal-
ysis in which we study the incentives of a particular individual tacking their
beliefs as given. It is not assumed, for instance, that one person’s beliefs
about another be correct or that outcomes be in equilibrium.
The example is as follows: Brian (who I will label B) has been employed
focus is clearly more on accurate predictions of behavior and so we want a theory that
reliable captures choice. But then the fact that alternative models tend to give the same
prediction seems less of a problem.
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by Ann (who I will label A) to do a job. The choice that Brian has to make
is how much effort to exert. Let e ≥ 0 denote the amount of effort that he
chooses and c(e) the associated cost. Assume that c is an increasing function
of effort. The issue of whether Ann can observe the effort of Brian is left
open at this stage. But it will be assumed that Ann pays a fixed wage that is
independent of effort. Ann is, thus, powerless to act even if she does observe
low effort. Suppose that Ann’s expected payoff is given by π(e) where π is
an increasing function of Brian’s effort.
Before we begin the analysis let me briefly relate this example to the
games commonly studied in the experimental literature. Most attention has
been on dictator and mini-trust games. In mapping our example to a dictator
game we can think of Brian as the dictator and Ann as the receiver. Choice
of effort is then the share that Brian gives to Ann. In mapping the example
to a mini-trust game (or ‘lost wallet game’) we can think of Brian as the
trustee and Ann the trustor. (In a mini-trust game the trustor makes a
binary decision to either trust or not and then conditional on being trusted
the trustee makes his decision. Our example, therefore, focuses on what
happens if Brian is trusted by Ann.) Choice of effort is then the amount
that Brian wants to ‘return’ to Ann.4
2.1 Different models of guilt
Belief-based guilt posits that Brian will feel guilty if he believes he has exerted
less effort than Ann was expecting. To keep things simple I will focus here on
spot beliefs. Then we can denote by λA the level of effort that Ann believes
Brian will exert. This is her first-order belief. And denote by λB Brian’s
(spot) belief about λA. This is Brian’s second-order belief. If e < λB then
Brian feels guilt. The amount of guilt he feels will be related to how much
lower Ann’s payoff is than expected. As an example, we could write Brian’s
utility function as5
ubb(e, λB) = −c(e)− γbb max {π(λB)− π(e), 0} (1)
4One issue that I should mention is whether Brian’s choice set is continuous or binary.
In our example it is continuous, as in some experiments (e.g. Dufwenberg and Gneezy
2000). In many experiments choice is binary (e.g. Charness and Dufwenberg 2006).
5More generally beliefs can be modeled as a probability distribution (Battigalli and
Dufwenberg 2007). Guilt still depends on the gap between realized and expected payoff.
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where γbb is a measure of Brian’s sensitivity to guilt. Note that Brian’s payoff
depends on both his action, e, and his belief, λB. This brings the belief-based
model under the umbrella of psychological game theory (Geanakoplos, Pearce
and Stacchetti 1989, Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2009).6 Also note that the
belief-based model predicts that Brian’s effort will be increasing in his second-
order belief, λB (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000, Charness and Dufwenberg
2006).7
Contrast belief-based guilt with what I will call reference-based guilt. The
basic idea here is that Brian feels guilty if he exerts less effort than some
reference level. This, of course, requires us to say what the reference level is.
I will get to this shortly. For now let us just take as given a reference level δ.
If e < δ then Brian feels guilt because he exerts less effort than the reference
level. As an example, we could write Brian’s utility function as
usr(e, δ) = −c(e)− γsr max {π (δ)− π (e) , 0} (2)
where γsr again measures sensitivity to guilt. The reference-based model
predicts that Brian’s effort will be increasing in his reference level δ.
Recall that in setting out the model I left it open whether or not Ann can
observe the effort of Brian. It is worth highlighting (more on this in Section
4.1) that Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007) distinguish between two different
models of belief-based guilt - simple guilt and guilt from blame (see also
Bacharach et al. 2007). With simple guilt Brian feels guilt irrespective of
whether Ann observes his effort. With guilt from blame Brian only feels guilt
if Ann observes his effort. In application this is an important distinction and
suggests, more generally, that observability of actions may be a key driver
in guilt influenced behavior. We will discuss this issue in full in Section 4.
For now I will merely point out that one can also distinguish between simple
guilt and guilt from blame in modeling reference-based guilt.
In principle there are, as illustrated in the introduction, clear differences
between a belief-based and reference-based model of guilt. In particular, if λB
differs widely from δ then we might obtain different predictions on how much
effort Brian would exert. For example, if δ < λB then Brian will have a larger
6Brian’s guilt is related to Ann’s payoff expectations and so, generally speaking, Brian
does not feel guilt from doing a different action than he believed Ann expected unless this
lowers Ann’s payoff.
7An alternative, or more general, model of belief-based guilt, proposed by Khalmetski,
Ockenfels and Werner (2015), allows that people get pleasure from surprising others. In
this case we may observe a negative correlation between effort and second-order beliefs.
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incentive to exert effort according to the belief-based than reference-based
model. To progress further, however, we need to tie down an interpretation
of the reference level. In the following I will interpret the reference level
as representing some social norm, or Brian’s interpretation of a norm. It is
though useful to distinguish between two common interpretations of a social
norm (Andrighetto et al. 2015).
One approach is to interpret a norm as an empirical expectation of what
others will do. In short, a norm becomes a norm when lots of people behave
consistently with the norm (e.g. Schelling 1978, Sugden 1986). In this case
the reference level of Brian should capture his expectation of what the ‘av-
erage’ person in his position would do. Specifically, we could think of δ as
Brian’s belief about the average effort chosen by workers. A second approach
to interpreting social norms is to view them as a normative expectation of
what people should do. With this interpretation, it is desirable to conform
to the norm irrespective of whether others do or not (e.g. Bernheim 1994,
Bicchieri 2006). The reference level δ would then represent Brian’s norma-
tive beliefs about what is the right thing to do. This gives us two different
versions of the reference-based model to compare.
Before we compare in detail the differences between the belief-based and
reference-based model I want to briefly highlight the ways in which different
incentives might interact. The possibilities here are endless and so I will
just provide one illustrative example. Suppose that Brian has belief-based
guilt but does not feel guilt over ‘excessive’ expectations of Ann (Khalmetski
2016). This requires a notion of excessive and so we need some form of
reference level (which brings us to the reference-based model). One example
is the following utility function
uh(e, λB, δ) =
{
−c(e)− γbb max {π (λB)− π (e) , 0} if λB ≤ αδ
−c(e)− γsr max {π (δ)− π (e) , 0} otherwise
(3)
where α ≥ 1 is a parameter. In interpretation, if Brian believes Ann’s
expectations are within factor α of his reference level then he experiences
belief-based guilt, but if her expectations are excessive then he reverts to
reference-based guilt. If α = 1 then any expectation above Brian’s reference
level is considered excessive and so Brian always takes the ‘most convenient’
interpretation when judging guilt. If α is large than we have belief-based
guilt.
Another thing to consider is heterogeneity of preferences. Some people
may be motivated by belief-based guilt, others by empirical conformity and
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so on. Moreover, we may obtain complex interaction effects. For instance,
the guilt from deviating from a normative belief may depend on the number
of others deviating (Lopez-Perez 2008, 2012); hence, normative beliefs and
empirical conformity become entangled. Or it may be that enough people
with normative beliefs choose the same action that this then influences the
second-order beliefs and empirical expectations of people not motivated di-
rectly by normative beliefs. Again, different motives to avoid guilt become
entangled. This hints at the difficulties of comparing between models of guilt.
2.2 Comparing between models
The preceding discussion illustrates that we should not imagine there is a
simple choice between the belief-based and reference-based models. Behav-
ior will inevitable be influenced by a multitude of factors. Even so it is
natural to try and unpick which factors seem most relevant. And in princi-
ple we now have three different things than can influence Brian’s actions -
his beliefs about what Ann expects, his empirical expectation as to what the
average person does, and his belief about what he ought to do. The following
hypothesis summarizes the analysis so far.
Hypothesis 1 : With belief-based guilt aversion Brian’s effort level is increas-
ing in his second-order belief of Ann’s expectations. With guilt based on
empirical conformity Brian’s effort level is increasing in his belief on average
effort in the population. With guilt based on normative beliefs Brian’s effort
level is increasing in his normative belief.
If we elicit Brian’s second-order beliefs, his belief on average effort in the
population and normative beliefs then we can, in principle, apply Hypothesis
1 and pick apart different influences. Unfortunately, things are unlikely to
be so simple in practice because of two distinct ‘problems’ - correlation of
beliefs and the false consensus effect. Let us consider each in turn.
First, compare an empirically based reference level, δ, with Brian’s second-
order beliefs, λB. If Brian and Ann know nothing about each other then we
should expect that δ = λB. In particular, it seems reasonable that Brian
would expect Ann to expect him to do what the average person in his posi-
tion would do. But that means that second-order beliefs coincide with the
empirically based reference level and we have no way to pick apart belief-
based guilt and empirical conformity. With a normatively based reference
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amount there could be a clearer distinction between what Brian thinks he
ought to do and what he believes Ann expects him to do. But even here it
would not be a surprise to find a high correlation between normative beliefs
and empirical expectations. For instance, if most people do what they think
they ought to do then we should get a high correlation (Lopez-Perez 2008).
If Brian and Ann have specific knowledge about each other then things
become more interesting because we might expect a divergence between δ and
λB. Suppose, for instance, that Brian has a reputation for being a very hard
worker. Then we might expect that λB > δ because Brian expects that Ann
expects him to work harder than the average. Or if Brian has a reputation
as a slacker then we might expect that λB < δ. In such situations the belief-
based model predicts that Brian focuses on the expectation of Ann when
interacting with Brian while the reference-based model predicts that Brian
focuses on an average interaction between worker and employer. This gives us
something to go on, although, as we shall see in Section 4.2, the fact Brian
and Ann knowing something about each other may bring in confounding
factors.8
Another complicating factor is the false consensus effect. The false con-
sensus effect captures the tendency of an individual to think that others are
like them (Ross, Greene, and House 1977, Marks and Miller 1987, Engelmann
and Strobel 2012). This may create a ‘spurious’ correlation between behav-
ior and second-order beliefs (Ellingsen et al. 2010). The specifics of this will
depend on the mechanism used to elicit beliefs (as discussed in Section 3).
But to understand the basic point suppose, by way of argument, that the
normative-based model is the ‘true model’. Would we be able to pick this
up? If Brian has a relatively high normative belief then he will exert high
effort. The false consensus effect would then suggest that, because he exerts
relatively high effort, he expects others to exert high effort. This, in turn,
might result in him putting a high estimate on the effort Ann expects him
to exert, and on average effort in the population.9 We obtain, therefore, not
8If hybrid models are considered it also becomes difficult to disentangle the basis for
guilt. Suppose, for example, that δ << λB and so there is a big gap between Brian’s
reference level and his belief on the expectations of Ann. This is precisely the kind of
gap that should allow us to identify a difference between belief-based and reference-based
guilt. If, however, Brian considers the λB belief as so outrageous that he can ignore it
without feeling guilt, then we may prematurely rule out belief-based guilt.
9Whether this is ‘false’ is open to debate. As Dawes (1989) points out, it may be
reasonable that person learns from their own choice. It only becomes ‘false’ if a person
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only a ‘true’ positive correlation between effort and normative belief but also
a spurious correlation between effort and second-order beliefs and between ef-
fort and empirical expectations. This means we may accept the belief-based
model even though the normative-based model is the true one. Generally
speaking, however, it is important to recognize that the false-consensus ef-
fect is not evidence against belief-based guilt aversion; it just means that
care is needed in interpreting correlations between effort and beliefs.
If there is a high correlation between second-order beliefs, empirical expec-
tations and normative beliefs (whether ‘real’ or caused by a false-consensus
effect) Hypothesis 1 loses bite. In particular, a positive correlation between,
say, effort and second-order beliefs is not compelling evidence in favor of
belief-based guilt aversion. Crucially this means, while it is somewhat pre-
empting the analysis to follow, that distinguishing between different models
is going to be very difficult. To merely look for correlations between effort
and beliefs is not enough. Moreover, any kind of treatment effect designed to
shift beliefs is likely to shift all beliefs (second-order, empirical and norma-
tive) and so is also not enough. We will, therefore, need to look for relatively
subtle ways to try and distinguish between models.
3 Beliefs and actions in the lab
Having set out a basic theoretical framework with which to work I shall now
turn to a survey of experimental results. In doing so I shall pay particu-
lar attention to the setting considered by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006),
namely a trust game with hidden action. This seems appropriate given that
their benchmark game has been studied very widely and so we have a rela-
tively large body of evidence with which to discern robust findings. Where
appropriate I shall also bring in related evidence from studies of the dictator
and trust game. Let me clarify, however, that I shall not delve deeply into
the large literature on lie aversion (e.g. López-Pérez and Spiegelman 2013,
Khalmetski 2016).
The benchmark (5,5) game studied by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
is depicted in Figure 1. Ann, the sender, can choose either In or Out. If
she chooses Out then the game ends with each getting a payoff of 5. If she
chooses In then Brian, the receiver, can either Roll a dice or Don’t roll. If he
does not roll then Ann gets a payoff of zero and Brian a payoff of 14. If the
overweights their own choice relative to other available evidence.
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dice is rolled then Brian gets a payoff of 10 while the payoff of Ann depends
on chance. There is a 1/6 chance of failure with Ann getting payoff of zero
and a 5/6 chance of success with Ann getting a payoff of 12. Note that Ann
is not informed whether a zero payoff is because Brian chose Don’t or chance
led to Failure. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) also considered a (7,7) game
where the payoff from Out is 7 for each player.
If we focus on monetary payoffs, in the (5,5) game, then a risk neutral Ann
should choose In if and only if she believes there is a 50% or better chance
that Brian will choose Roll. In the (7,7) game the relevant proportion is
70%. In general, Ann is only going to choose In if she believes there is a
significant chance that Brian will choose Roll.10 If, therefore, Ann chooses
In and Brian chooses Don’t then Brian can experience guilt because he ‘lets
down’ Ann. Anticipation of this guilt may be sufficient for Brian to choose
Roll. In relating this game to the theoretical example in Section 2 we can
equate Roll with Brian choosing a high level of effort and Don’t as choosing
a low level of effort.
Figure 1: The (5,5) game of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006).
10If we add in social preferences then the belief necessary to incentivize Ann to choose
In may well need to be more than 50% because the (In, Don’t) outcome is ‘bad’ in that it
is unkind, leads to inequality etc. Note also that Ann may suffer guilt from choosing Out
if she believes that Brian is expecting her to choose In (Attanasi, Battigalli and Manzoni
2015).
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Table 1: The average guess of receivers who choose Don’t roll and Roll for the
five treatments of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and directly comparable
treatments in other studies.
Study Treatment Don’t Roll
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) (5,5) no message 39.6 54.2
(5,5) B message 45.1 73.2
(5,5) A message 50.0 69.6
(7,7) no message 41.7 69.4
(7,7) B message 36.9 66.9
Charness and Dufwenberg (2010) (5,5) Bare promise 53.1 60.8
Ellingsen et al. (2010) (5,5) no message 51.4 65.5
Amdur and Schmik (2013) (5,5) no message 48.6 40.2
3.1 Guess-the-average approach
A belief-based model of guilt aversion would predict that Brian is more likely
to Roll the higher is his second-order belief on the probability of Roll. But
how to measure second-order beliefs?11 Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
take the following approach, which I shall call the guess-the-average approach.
Senders were asked to predict what proportion of receivers (in the experimen-
tal session) would choose Roll.12 This is a proxy for first-order beliefs. And
receivers were asked to guess the average guess made by senders. This is a
proxy for second-order beliefs. Consistent with belief-based guilt aversion a
strong correlation was observed between receiver’s choice and their guess of
the average. To illustrate Table 1 details the average guess of receivers who
chose Don’t and those who chose Roll in the treatments of Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006) and those from directly comparable studies. (Note that
we will look in detail at the role of messages in Section 4.)
To quote Charness and Dufwenberg (p. 1589, 2006) ‘In all five treatments,
B’s who chose Roll made significantly higher guesses about A’s guesses than
did B’s who chose Don’t Roll. ... We conclude that the support for guilt
11A related question is whether elicitation of beliefs changes behavior. Guerra and Zizzo
(2004) find evidence that it does not. But Ockenfels and Werner (2014) show that the
way beliefs are elicited can have subtle effects.
12An experimental session would have many senders and receivers playing the (5,5) game
in pairs.
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aversion is considerable in all of our treatments.’ It should be noted that
Charness and Dufwenberg (2010), Ellingsen et al. (2010), and Andrighetto
et al. (2015) do not find an effect that is statistically significant at the 5%
level, and Amdur and Schmick (2013) actually observe a negative, again
statistically insignificant, correlation.13 If, however, we slightly extend our
gaze to include studies with more substantive variations on the (5,5) game
(e.g. Dufwenberg and Charness 2000, Chang et al. 2011, Bracht and Regner
2013, Bellemare et al. 2017) the evidence clearly points towards the following
result.
Finding 1 : There is a strong positive correlation between behavior and sec-
ond order beliefs elicited using the guess-the-average approach.
A positive correlation between receiver’s choice and guess is clearly con-
sistent with the belief-based model. Is it also consistent with reference-based
guilt? The guess-the-average approach provides a very natural estimate of
beliefs regarding population averages. Finding 1, therefore, is also consistent
with empirical conformity. In terms of normative beliefs, it seems reasonable
to assume that a person can have one of two normative reference points,
namely (Out, Don’t) or (In, Roll). If Brian has normative expectation (Out,
Don’t) then he need feel no guilt by choosing Don’t; Ann was ‘dumb’ to
choose In. By contrast, if Brian has expectation (In, Roll) then he would
feel guilt if he was to choose Don’t. The normative beliefs model would,
thus, predict that Brian is more likely to Roll if he thinks of (In, Roll) as the
relevant reference point. There is no reason to suppose that the guess-the-
average approach is a good measure of normative beliefs. A false consensus
effect would, however, result in those who think of (In, Roll), or (Out, Don’t),
as the relevant reference point expecting others to also think that way. We
may, therefore, expect a positive correlation between receiver’s choice of Roll
and guess as to what senders expect.
In summary, Finding 1 is consistent with belief-based guilt aversion and
empirical conformity. If we allow for a false-consensus effect, then it is also
consistent with normatively-based guilt. So, while Finding 1 is important
evidence that guilt influences actions, it does not help us much distinguish
between models of guilt.
13The results of Andrighetto et al. (2015) are not included in Table 1 because they do
not provide data in this format.
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3.2 The payoff-expectation approach
The guess-the-average approach is only one possible way of eliciting beliefs
and various alternatives have been considered in the literature (see Schotter
and Trevino 2014 for a general review). Most attention has focused on the
disclosure approach that I shall discuss in the next section. Before doing that
I briefly want to comment on the approach of Ismayilov and Potters (2016),
which is closely related to that of Vanberg (2008) (see also Bacharach et al.
2007).
Ismayilov and Potters (2016) asked senders to say what they thought
their payoff would be if they chose In. The options were: almost certainly 0,
probably 0, not sure, probably 12, almost certainly 12. Receivers were then
asked to guess which option the sender had chosen. Note that this approach
differs from the guess-the-average approach in that it asks receivers to make
a direct prediction on the payoff expectation of the sender with whom they
are matched rather than predict population averages. For this reason I will
call it the payoff-expectation approach to eliciting second-order beliefs.
If the receiver has not interacted with the sender in any way then we
would expect the payoff-expectation approach to give similar results to the
guess-the-average approach. In particular, the lack of contact means the re-
ceiver can only assume the sender with whom he is matched is ‘average’. If,
however, the sender and receiver do communicate then clearly the relation-
ship becomes more personalized and so the payoff-expectation approach may
yield different results to the guess-the-average approach. Indeed, the payoff-
expectation approach would seem to more naturally capture the belief-based
model’s assumption that Brian cares about the expectations of Ann while
the guess-the-average approach better captures the empirically conformity
model’s assumption that Brian cares about average behavior.
A comparison of the payoff-expectation and guess-the-average approaches
would be of interest. Unfortunately, we do not have any evidence to go
on. All we can say is that both Vanberg (2008) and Ismayilov and Potters
(2016) find a positive correlation between the choice to Roll and second-
order beliefs measured using the payoff-expectation approach. Ismayilov and
Potters (2012), for instance, report that in the absence of communication
those who Roll have average beliefs of 59% and those who Don’t have average
beliefs of 43%.14 The corresponding beliefs in the case of communication are
14To put a number to average beliefs the 5 possible options are converted into percent-
ages. For instance, almost certainly 0 is interpreted as an 87.5% probability of payoff 0
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60% and 46%. This difference is highly significant and consistent with the
numbers in Table 1. So, there is evidence that Finding 1 can be extended to
include the payoff-expectation approach.
3.3 The disclosure approach
The disclosure approach to measuring, or perhaps more correctly inducing,
second-order beliefs works as follows. Senders, as in the guess-the-average
approach, are asked what proportion of receivers they expect will Roll. The
receiver is then told the guess made by the sender, i.e. the receiver is told the
first-order beliefs of the sender. In principle this means that receivers have
‘perfect’ second order beliefs because they know exactly what the sender
expected. Note that there are some practical difficulties in implementing
this approach because it is important that disclosure should not become a
means of communication. Senders, therefore, should not be aware that their
guess will be passed onto the receiver and receivers need to know that senders
were not aware their guess would be passed on. This may lead to receivers
questioning whether they have been ‘told everything’.15 Let us, however, put
aside this issue here and focus on the results.
Ellingsen et al. (2010) and Kawagoe and Narita (2014) use the disclosure
approach. Table 2 details the average guess observed by receivers who chose
Don’t and those who chose Roll. These results provide a stark contrast with
those in Table 1. Crucially, there is no evidence that receiver’s choice of
Roll is correlated with the sender’s guess (although Reuben, Sapienza and
Zingales (2009) provide some contra-evidence in a trust game and Ockenfels
and Werner (2014) for a dictator game).
Finding 2 : The choice to Roll does not correlate with disclosed beliefs of
senders.
The belief-based model would suggest a correlation between choice and
and probably 0 a 67.5% chance etc.
15There are different approaches to tackling this issue. Ellingsen et al. (2010) explicitly
tell receivers that senders were not informed their guess would be passed on. Bellemare
et al. (2017) do not explicitly tell receivers that senders were not informed. Reuben et al.
(2009) use a multi-task experiment in which beliefs from one task are used in a subsequent
task. This has the advantage that all subjects receive identical instructions. Khalmetski
et al. (2015), see their experiment 3 and 4, allow senders to choose whether or not heir
beliefs are passed to the receiver.
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Table 2: The disclosed beliefs for receivers who choose Don’t roll and Roll.
Study Treatment Don’t Roll
Ellingsen et al. (2010) (5,5) No message 45.7 41.6
Kawagoe and Narita (2014) (5,5) No message 51.7 44.5
(5,5) B message 54.3 51.8
disclosed beliefs. Finding 2 is, therefore, fairly strong evidence against the
belief-based model. Moreover, Ellingsen et al. (2010) obtain similar findings
in two other games (a dictator game and trust game) and so the evidence
against the belief-based model cannot be easily dismissed. At face-value this
gives us two basic ways to interpret the ‘discrepancy’ between Findings 1 and
2. One is to claim it provides strong support for the reference-based model.
In particular, it seems reasonable that the disclosed beliefs of the sender
would not change the receiver’s view on average behavior in the population
or change their normative beliefs (because it is just the opinion of one other
person). Seen in this light, Finding 1, which provides strong evidence of a
correlation between choice and empirical expectations, together with Find-
ing 2, no correlation with disclosed beliefs, points to the role of empirical
conformity.
Another interpretation of the ‘discrepancy’ between Findings 1 and 2 is
to say that Finding 1 is entirely driven by the false-consensus effect. If true
then this would mean that guilt, whether belief-based or reference-based, is
not a big influence on behavior. To appreciate the argument consider an
extreme case in which heterogeneity of receivers’ behavior is driven entirely
by a misunderstanding of the instructions. The false consensus effect would
then result in those who ‘randomly’ chose Roll expecting others to also choose
Roll. This gives Finding 1. While they are not influenced by the disclosed
belief of the sender. This gives us Finding 2. This is an extreme scenario but
illustrates the challenge that Finding 2 provides.
So, is there any way to reconcile belief-based guilt aversion with Finding
2? For further insight consider the studies of Bellemare, Sebald and Strobel
(2011) and Bellemare, Sebald and Suetens (2017). While neither study di-
rectly considers the (5,5) game of Charness and Dufwenberg they do study
closely related dictator and trust games. Moreover, payoff parameters are
systematically varied so as to estimate guilt sensitivity, or the willingness to
pay to avoid guilt. The crucial thing for us, is that both studies directly com-
pare the guess-the-average approach of eliciting second-order beliefs with the
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disclosure approach. Bellemare et al. (2017) also considers a menu approach
that I shall look at in the next section.
Bellemare et al. (2011) estimate a structural model based on Battigalli
and Dufwenberg (2007). In doing so they disentangle the false consensus
effect from belief-based guilt aversion. Specifically, they use the guess-the-
average approach to elicit beliefs before jointly estimating second-order be-
liefs and choices allowing for a correlation between guilt aversion and stated
beliefs. This then allows them to say how much of the willingness to pay
to avoid guilt is due to ‘genuine’ guilt aversion and how much is due to the
correlation between guilt aversion and stated beliefs (i.e. the false consensus
effect). Within subject comparison of treatments using the guess-the-average
approach and disclosure approach then allows them to further pinpoint the
size of the false-consensus effect. They find evidence of a large false-consensus
effect (that increases estimated willingness to pay by factor 3) but also find,
controlling for the consensus effect, significant evidence of a correlation be-
tween choice and second-order beliefs.
Even more telling is arguably the results of Bellemare et al. (2017).
They find a strong correlation between choice and second-order beliefs using
both the guess-the-average and menu approach. This is further evidence in
support of Finding 1. They also found no correlation between choice and
disclosed first-order beliefs. This is further evidence in support of Finding
2. Crucially, there design allows insight on why the disclosure approach
gives different results and they find that the disclosure approach results in
more ‘cooperative’ behavior (or to map into our context a higher proportion
choosing Roll). In other words, a person appears more likely to Roll when
the disclosure approach is used than when the guess-the-average approach is
used.16
The results of Bellemare et al. (2017) suggest that the disclosure approach
may not be an innocuous way of inducing beliefs. A likely explanation comes
from the possibility that disclosing beliefs creates a connection between the
sender and receiver. Note that experiments using the disclosure approach
are carefully designed so that disclosure cannot be a form of cheap talk
(or be perceived as a form of cheap talk). Even so, it still leads to the
responder knowing something about the sender. As we shall see in Section
16This eliminates the correlation between choice and beliefs because it is those with low
beliefs that are least likely to Roll (in the guess-the-average approach) and so more likely
to be influenced.
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4, a connection between sender and responder, however weak it may seem,
can lead to an increase in the proportion who Roll. And it does not seem
implausible that this effect would primarily impact on sender’s with low
expectations. This may offer an explanation for Finding 2. In the next
sub-section we look at a related explanation.
3.4 Menu approach
With the menu approach Brian is able to condition his actions on the beliefs
of Ann. More specifically, senders, as in the disclosure and guess-the-average
approach, are asked what proportion of receivers they expect to Roll. The
receiver is then asked to say whether or not he would Roll for all of the
possible beliefs that Ann may disclose. Outcomes are then determined by
Ann’s disclosed belief and Brian’s conditional action. The menu approach
shares the same difficulties as the disclosure approach in the sense that Brian
should not think Ann’s beliefs are a form of communication (Khalmetski et
al. 2015, see also Attanasi, Battigalli and Nagel 2016). Crucially, it also
shares the property that choice is based on the disclosed beliefs of Ann, it is
just that disclosure happens after Brian has written down his strategy.
As already noted, Bellemare et al. (2017) obtain similar results using
the menu approach to the guess-the-average approach, which are different to
those using the disclosure approach. Generally speaking, decisions elicited
under the strategy method (which in our case would be the menu approach)
are similar to those elicited under the action method (which in our case would
be disclosure) but that does not mean there are not exceptions (Brandts and
Charness 2000, 2011). The results of Bellemare et al. (2017) suggest that
we potentially have one of those exceptions. This may point towards an
experimenter demand effect in which asking subjects to condition on disclosed
beliefs influences behavior, i.e. the menu approach is ‘biasing’ choice. This
interpretation, however, seems hard to reconcile with the similarity between
the guess-the-average and menu approach. The alternative interpretation is
that the disclosure method has an effect on the interaction between Ann and
Brian beyond mere revelation of beliefs (Schotter and Trevino 2014).
The study of Khalmetski et al. (2015) allows additional insight. They
revisit the dictator game setting of Ellingsen et al. (2010) but using the menu
approach rather than a disclosure approach (see their experiments 1 and 3).
Consistent with Finding 2, and the results of Ellingsen et al. (2010), they
observe no correlation between behavior and disclosed beliefs. The crucial
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new insight, however, is to recognize that this aggregate level correlation
masks interesting individual level behavior. In particular, Khalmetski et al
(2015) find that over 50% of subjects correlate their choice with beliefs (see
also Attanasi et al. 2016). Most behave consistent with belief-based guilt-
aversion in that their is a positive correlation but a significant proportion of
subjects exhibit a negative correlation. It is this heterogeneity of behavior
that causes the lack of correlation at the aggregate level.
In summary, we have seen two reasons why Finding 2 may not be com-
pelling evidence against the belief-based model of guilt aversion. First, the
disclosure method itself may change the relationship between Ann and Brian.
In this regard it is worth highlighting that Khalmetski et al. (2015) interpret
a negative correlation between choices and beliefs as a desire to make sur-
prising gifts. This broadly fits the idea that reduced social distance between
Brian and Ann may increase the Roll rate of Brian. A second reason to
question the importance of Finding 2 is the evidence that interesting things
are happening at the individual level even if this does not show through in
aggregate level data. This is not to say the false-consensus effect does not
exist; it clearly does. Indeed, Khalmetski et al. (2015) also elicit second
order beliefs using the guess-the-average approach and reaffirm that there is
evidence of a false-consensus effect. But, the weight of evidence suggests that
the false-consensus effect is not responsible for all of the correlation between
choice and second-order beliefs.
Finding 3 : There is a correlation between choice and disclosed second-order
beliefs using the menu approach. At the individual level this correlation may
be positive (consistent with guilt) or negative (consistent with surprising
gifts).
3.5 Normative beliefs
The guess-the-average approach to eliciting second-order beliefs fits natu-
rally with empirically-based guilt aversion while the disclosure and menu
approaches fit naturally with belief-based guilt aversion. As of yet, I have
had little to say about normative beliefs. That is primarily because studies
have not elicited normative beliefs.
Andrighetto et al. (2015) is an important exception. As well as eliciting
second-order beliefs using the guess-the-average approach they elicit a range
of normative beliefs. Specifically, senders were asked to say whether they feel
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entitled that Brian choose Roll. Receivers were asked whether they ought
to choose Roll (own normative belief), to guess the proportion of senders
who felt entitled (second-order normative expectations on senders), and to
guess the proportion of receivers who feel they ought to Roll (second-order
normative expectations on receivers). The headline result of Andrighetto et
al. (2015) is that the choice to Roll (and Exit which we shall look at shortly)
correlates significantly with the normative beliefs of the receiver (however
these are measured).
Finding 4 : There is evidence that choice to Roll correlates with normative
beliefs.
Andrighetto et al. (2015) interpret their results as supporting the im-
portance of normative beliefs over empirical conformity. Recall, however,
that the false consensus effect makes it difficult to conclude too much from
Finding 4, particularly given the evidence of a strong correlation between
behavior and second-order beliefs. So, this is a topic that warrants further
investigation.
4 Hidden actions and communication
The preceding section has illustrated that Hypothesis 1 is limited in appli-
cation. The experimental evidence has given us a much better picture of
how choices are influenced by beliefs and the likely size of the false-consensus
effect. And we have fairly compelling evidence that guilt influences behavior
in some form. But, whether that guilt is belief or reference-based remains
unclear. This suggests we may have to look beyond correlation between
choices and beliefs if we want to disentangle different influences. Two possi-
bilities about which some evidence exists are the observability of actions and
communication.
4.1 Hidden actions
In introducing the example in Section 2 it was left ambiguous whether Ann
would observe the effort of Brian (or be able to discern the reason why her
payoff is as it is).17 Suppose that Ann will not know how much effort Brian
17Recall that π(e) is expected payoff and so there is scope for random shocks etc.
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exerted because, say, output is subject to random shocks or quality of service
is unobservable. Both Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Battigalli and
Dufwenberg (2007) allow that a person can experience simple belief-based
guilt when actions are not observable. There are though strong arguments,
that because of guilt from blame, belief-based guilt will be higher when effort
is observed (Charness and Dufwenberg 2011).18
In the reference-based model we could also distinguish simple guilt and
guilt from blame. The nature of both empirical conformity and normatively
based guilt suggest, however, that Brian is not interested, per-se, in whether
he lets Ann down. More relevant would seem to be whether effort is publicly
observable. A nice combination of treatments in the study by Tadelis (2011)
illustrates the issue. In one treatment there is matched pairs and public
exposure, meaning that everyone in the room is told the action of Brian and
Ann knows that she was matched with Brian. Here belief-based guilt from
blame should be prominent because Brain knows that Ann will know what
he did. In another treatment there is anonymous public exposure, meaning
that everyone knows what Brian did but now Ann cannot know for sure she
was matched with this particular Brian. Here, belief-based guilt from blame
seems less relevant but reference-based guilt would seem unaffected.
Variations in exposure provide a way to distinguish variants of the belief-
based model, such as, simple guilt and guilt from blame. And, as we have
just seen, may also provide a way to distinguish between belief-based and
reference-based guilt. The following hypothesis picks up some elements of
this.
Hypothesis 2 : With simple belief-based or reference-based guilt the effort of
Brian is not influenced by the observability of his actions. With belief-based
guilt from blame the effort of Brian is influenced by the observability of his
actions by Ann. With reference-based guilt from blame the effort of Brian is
influenced by whether his actions are publicly observable.
Now to the evidence. In the original Charness and Dufwenberg (2006)
design, senders are not told why they get a payoff of 0. Brian, therefore,
acts knowing that Ann will not be able to tell if he chose Roll, and she
18There is also a distinction between outcome disappointment where Brian feels guilt if
he expects Ann to get a lower payoff than she expected and person disappointment where
Brian feels guilt if he expects Ann to form a negative opinion of him (Bacharach et al.
2007).
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was unlucky, or he chose Don’t, and caused her low payoff. This lack of
exposure to the cause of a low payoff puts the focus on simple guilt (Battigalli
and Dufwenberg 2007). If Ann is able to observe, or is exposed to, the
actions of Brian then we have a setting where guilt from blame is possible.
A comparison of treatments with and without exposure allows us, therefore,
to gain insight on Hypothesis 2.
Three studies have looked specifically at exposure. Both Bracht and Reg-
ner (2013) and Tadelis (2011) find that a significantly higher proportion of
receivers chose Roll when there is exposure. Andrighetto et al. (2015) do
not find a statistically significant effect when directly comparing treatments
with and without exposure. Their study does, however, nicely demonstrate
the importance of exposure. Specifically, they consider a game, see Figure
2, in which Brian can choose Exit. If Brian chooses Exit then Ann is told
that Brian chose Roll. So, Brian can effectively pay to escape any guilt from
blame. Around 20% of subjects chose Exit. This shows that exposure mat-
ters. Note, however, that 17 to 32% of subjects (depending on the treatment)
still chose to Roll, even though they could Exit. These results point towards
a role for both simple guilt and guilt from blame. For instance, those choos-
ing Exit avoid guilt from blame while those choosing Roll, rather than Exit,
avoid simple guilt.
Recall that Tadelis (2011) compares various treatments combining matched
exposure (where the sender is informed) to those with public exposure (where
actions are announced to everyone in the room). He finds that exposure
whether public or merely to the sender has an almost identical effect on be-
havior. This would seem something of a challenge to the reference-based
model. To defend the model we would need to argue that Brian equates Ann
observing his action with his action being publicly observable. Or that Brian
does not care directly about Ann’s payoff expectations but does care about
whether Ann observes him disappointing those payoff expectations. This is
something that could be explored in future work.
Finding 5 : The decision to Roll is influenced by whether actions will be
observable to the sender or publicly observable. The type of exposure appears
to make no difference.
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Figure 2: The exit game of Andrighetto et al. (2015).
4.2 Communication from Brian to Ann
Much of the literature on guilt aversion has focused on communication. So,
returning to the example in Section 2, suppose that Brian makes a promise
to Ann that he will exert effort level p. This promise may change Brian’s
beliefs about the effort level Ann is expecting. We do need to consider the
credibility of the promise p, because if Brian has no intention of keeping his
promise then why should he expect Ann to believe his promise. Even so,
there is a clear sense in which beliefs, λB, should move towards p.
What of the reference-based model? As the reviewer of an earlier version
of the paper pointed out, we have to condition empirical expectations and
normative beliefs on the fact that a promise has been made. For instance, the
reference level for empirical conformity would be based on average behavior
of those who have promised to exert effort level p. In the normative-based
model it would be based on what is the right thing to do given a promise of
p. This suggests that a promise can also change the reference level (Lopez-
Perez 2012). And again we would expect it to change in the direction of the
promise.
The preceding discussion suggests that promises will likely matter. That
is not a particularly bold hypothesis. Crucially, however, it may give us
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more to go in terms of Hypothesis 1. In particular, communication may
start to drive a wedge between Brian’s second-order beliefs and empirical
expectations (or normative beliefs) because Ann and Brian start to ‘know
something about each other’. For that to work we ideally would like that
promises do not have an effect beyond beliefs. So, an important hypothesis,
following Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), is that the effect of promises
is solely captured by changes in beliefs. In other words we can still apply
equations (1) or (2) we just have to recognize that a promise may change
beliefs, λB, or the reference level δ.
Hypothesis 3 : A promise from Brian to Ann may change his behavior but only
through the effect the promise has on second-order beliefs or the reference
level.
Hypothesis 3 encapsulates a ‘pure’ form of belief-based guilt in that it
says only beliefs matter. Similarly it encapsulates a pure form of reference-
based guilt. So, what are the alternatives? It may be that promises have
an influence beyond any effect on beliefs or the reference-level. For instance,
Kawagoe and Narita (2014) argue that a person only feels guilt if they make
a promise that is believed and then fail to fulfill the promise. With this
approach letting someone down, of itself, does not induce guilt; which is
a big step away from the belief-based and reference-based models outlined
in Section 2. Instead, Brian only feels guilt if he promises to exert effort
and then lets Ann down. The intuition here is that Brian feels guilt if he
directly influences Ann’s beliefs and then let’s down those beliefs. The model
proposed by Kawagoe and Narita (2014) is an extreme possibility that would
struggle to explain the results in Section 3. But it nicely illustrates the
more general point that Brian’s guilt can be amplified by any change in
Ann’s payoff expectations that was induced by a promise he made (see also
Balafoutas and Sutter 2016).
A related issue is that of lie-aversion. Lie aversion, at its most basic level,
says that Brian will dislike lying (or failing to keep a promise).19 This also
means that promises may have an influence beyond their effect on beliefs.
To illustrate, suppose, returning to our theoretical example, that Brian be-
lieves that Ann was expecting an effort level of 20. If he exerts effort 10
19In the simple setting considered in Section 2 the incentive to lie is not explicitly
modeled. But, generally speaking, Brian has an incentive to lie if this will induce Ann to,
say, pay a higher wage.
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without making any promises then his payoff is −c(10)− γbb (π (20)− π(10))
where the second term represents his guilt from disappointing Ann’s pay-
off expectation. Now, suppose that Brian promises to exert effort level 20.
Clearly this promise should not be expected to change Brian’s belief about
the effort Ann was expecting. It seems, though, perfectly reasonable that
Brian also feels ‘guilt from lying’. His payoff would now be something like
−c(10)− γbb (π (20)− π(10))−G where the G term represents his guilt from
not fulfilling his promise.20 Guilt from lying, therefore, adds an extra influ-
ence on behavior.
In the benchmark treatment of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) subjects
could not communicate. This was compared with treatments where Brian
is allowed to send a message to Ann and a treatment where Ann is allowed
to send a message to Brian. Note that a free form message was allowed
in which anything could be written. Table 3 summarizes the proportion of
receivers choosing Roll by treatment. We can see that if Brian is able to send
a message there is a significant increase in the proportion who choose Roll.
A similar result is observed by Kawagoe and Narita (2014).21 In interpreting
these numbers it is important to take account of the message that was sent.
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that receivers who promised to Roll
were significantly more likely to Roll than those who did not promise.
Overall, the results of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) lend support to
Hypothesis 3 in that promises matter (see Table 3) and influence beliefs (see
Table 1). But that is not the end of the story. To further the discussion I
will consider in some detail two papers that look at careful manipulations of
communication.
Consider first the study of Vanberg (2008). Before we delve into the
results let me highlight that the setting considered by Vanberg (2008) is
somewhat different to that considered by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006).
Vanberg (2008) essentially does away with the In or Out choice of Ann. So,
we end up with a dictator game in which Brian chooses whether to Roll
or Don’t Roll. Another twist is that the two players communicate between
each other before they know who will be in the role of Ann and who will
20There are many different models of lie aversion including belief-based lie aversion
(Lopez-Perez and Spiegelman 2013). It is beyond the scope of the current paper to delve
deeply into that issue. But it is worth highlighting that there is now abundant evidence
people dislike lying per-se (Erat and Gneezy 2012).
21The effect observed by Kawagoe and Narita (2014) is not statistically significant
(Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.415) but the number of observations is small.
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Table 3: The proportion (%) of receivers who choose Roll depending on the
type of communication varying between no communication (no), communi-
cation from Brian to Ann (B), from Ann to Brian (A) and between Ann and
Brian (AB).
Study Treatment No B A AB
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) (5,5) 44 67 39
(7,7) 25 49 -
Kawagoe and Narita (2014) (5,5) 30 42 -
Vanberg (2008) Dictator 51 - - 74
No switch - - - 69
Switch - - - 54
Ismayilov and Potters (2016) Can promise 28 51
Cannot promise 45 52
Bracht and Regner (2013) (5,5) 33 56
Exposure 42 67
be Brian. It is this uncertainty which creates the main incentive for making
promises. In particular, a subject may promise he will Roll in the hope this
would encourage the other subject to Roll if they end up being the dictator.
Despite these differences Vanberg (2008) finds similar results to Charness and
Dufwenberg (2008) in control treatments with and without communication
(see the dictator row in Table 3).
The main novelty of Vanberg (2008) is to randomly switch the matching
of subjects after communication has taken place. The dictator is aware if a
switch has been made but the other subject is not. Moreover, the dictator
is made aware if a promise was made to his new match. Vanberg (2008)
finds that dictators were significantly more likely to Roll if they remained
matched to the subject with whom they had communicated than if they
were switched. Crucially, however, second-order beliefs (measured using the
payoff-expectation approach) were the same whether a switch took place or
not. This result is inconsistent with Hypothesis 3 and the Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006) claim that behavior can be captured entirely through
second-order beliefs. If this was the case then the Roll rate would be the
same in the switch and no switch condition (given that second-order beliefs
remain unchanged).
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Consider next the study of Ismayilov and Potters (2016). The starting
point here is the (5,5) game of Charness and Dufwenberg with Brian being
able to send a message to Ann. The main twist is that there is only a 50%
chance of a message being delivered. Brian is told whether or not the message
was delivered before deciding to Roll. Ismayilov and Potters (2016) find that
receivers who made a promise to Roll were significantly more likely to act on
that promise if the message was delivered. More surprising, is that receivers
who did not make a promise were also significantly more likely to Roll if the
message was delivered. Indeed, receivers who sent a blank message were more
likely to Roll when the message was delivered! Moreover, it is shown that
this effect cannot be accounted for solely through changes in second-order
beliefs.
It seems, therefore, that the mere act of communication seems to make
a difference. A further treatment explores this by allowing Brian to send a
message to Ann but not make any promises about how he will play the game.
Ismayilov and Potters (2016) find that receivers are again more likely to Roll
if the message was delivered, although the effect in this instance is statistically
insignificant. Note that the fact communication, of itself, can have an effect
is also consistent with the results of Vanberg (2008) where dictators are
more likely to Roll if they communicated with the current match. We can
summarize as follows.
Finding 6 : The proportion of receivers who Roll is influenced by communi-
cation from Brian to Ann. But this influence cannot be accounted for solely
through a change in second-order beliefs.
If we compare Finding 6 with Hypothesis 3 then the evidence on commu-
nication is mixed. So, what can we take away from this? There can be no
doubt that the literature studying guilt and communication has taught us a
lot about communication. I am less convinced that it has taught us much
about guilt-aversion. The original hope of Charness and Dufwenberg (2006),
that the effects of communication can be entirely captured with a belief-
based model of guilt aversion, has proved overly optimistic. Instead, we have
learned that communication appears to bring with it a host of confound-
ing factors including lie-aversion and reduced social-distance. It particularly
seems to be the case that communication interacts with guilt aversion in
important ways (see also Kawagoe and Narita 2014 and Balafoutas and Sut-
ter 2016). For instance, it may that Brian feels more guilt if he lets down
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expectations that were directly influenced by him.
Interestingly, even Finding 6 and the rejection of Hypothesis 3 leaves
ample scope for belief-based guilt aversion to explain all the effects of com-
munication. To appreciate this point consider Khalmetski (2016). Here guilt
from lying is modeled using belief-based guilt aversion (see also Battigalli,
Charness and Dufwenberg 2013). A clever experiment design is then used to
induce an exogenous shift in second-order beliefs. Crudely put, two treat-
ments were compared in which the amount a lie would let down the payoff
expectations of a receiver were high or low. Belief-based guilt aversion then
predicts second-order beliefs on the rate of honesty are larger in the high
treatment. This, in turn, should lead to more truth-telling in the high treat-
ment. Khalmetski (2016) finds strong support for the belief-based model. So,
belief-based guilt aversion can explain why someone would keep a promise.
We then need to consider the interaction between guilt from failing to repay
trust and guilt from failing to keep a promise.
The extent to which communication can help us disentangle the evidence
for belief-based guilt aversion appears, therefore, moot. Let me emphasize,
however, that this should not be interpreted as evidence against guilt aver-
sion. It merely reflects the fact that communication brings with it other fac-
tors that seem hard to control. Several studies have shown that second-order
beliefs still matter when there is communication suggesting that the models
of guilt discussed in Section 2 are still relevant (Charness and Dufwenberg
2006, Andrighetto et al. 2015, Ismayilov and Potters 2016).
4.3 Communication from Ann to Brian
Consider finally the possibility that Ann can communicate with Brian. This
will presumably take the form of Ann suggesting how much effort Brian
should exert. Such a suggestion may change Brian’s beliefs about the effort
level Ann is expecting. Again, the consequences of this in a belief-based
model of guilt can already be captured in equation (1). Clearly, we need to
consider the credibility of the suggestion. It seems reasonable, however, to
assume that the suggestion can have a significant effect on Brian’s second-
order beliefs. If, for instance, Ann’s suggestion is below the level that Brian
was expecting then he will surely revise down his second-order beliefs.
In a reference-based model of guilt, by contrast, there is little reason why
Ann’s suggestion should change Brian’s reference level. It is plausible that an
‘unexpected’ suggestion may make Brian revise his estimate of average effort
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in the population or question his normative beliefs. The effect, however, is
likely to be small, particularly if we take account of the false consensus effect.
This leads to our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 : With belief-based guilt the action of Brian will weakly move
in the direction of Ann’s suggestion. With reference-based guilt the action
of Brian should not depend on the suggestion of Ann.
Crucially, lie aversion is not going to matter here. Communication from
Ann to Brian is, therefore, potentially a good way of distinguishing between
the belief-based and reference-based model. I will, however, mention one
possible confound. Namely, it may be that Ann’s suggestion changes Brian’s
intrinsic desire to exert effort. This could manifest itself in different ways.
For instance, a relatively low suggestion may motivate Brian to surprise Ann
with high effort (Khalmetski et al. 2015). Or, a high suggestion, even if
it was consistent with Brian’s beliefs, may appear presumptuous and crowd-
out intrinsic motivation (Bacharach et al 2007). A suggestion may, therefore,
have an effect in the reference-based model despite not changing the refer-
ence level because it changes other things like sensitivity to guilt. Or, more
generally, that it brings in other factors like reduced social distance.
Summarizing the experimental results on communication from Ann to
Brian is easy enough for the simple reason that Charness and Dufwenberg
(2006) is the only study of which I am aware that considers this possibility.
As you can see in Table 3, such communication appears to make no difference
to Brian’s choice. Applying Hypothesis 4 this is evidence in support of the
reference-based model. Clearly, however, it would be nice to have more
evidence on this issue.
5 Conclusion
My objective in this paper was to review the evidence on belief-based guilt
aversion, with a particular focus on behavior in trust and dictator games.
The belief-based model says that a person experiences guilt if they let down
the payoff expectations of another (Battigalli and Dufwenberg 2007). The
predictions of this model were compared to those of a reference-based model
in which a person experiences guilt if they deviate from a norm, either em-
pirically or normatively based. The theoretical analysis highlighted the diffi-
culties of distinguishing between the different models. This carried through
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to the review of the experimental evidence where we find broad support for
both models.
While the basic conclusion is that the existing experimental evidence
supports both the belief-based and reference-based models of guilt aversion it
is important to recognize that not all the evidence is positive. In particular,
evidence that exposure, or observability of actions, makes a difference to
behavior is easier to reconcile with the belief-based model than reference-
based model (e.g. Tadelis 2011, Bracht and Regner 2014). On the other hand,
evidence that behavior is more closely correlated with beliefs elicited using
a guess-the-average approach than disclosure approach is easier to reconcile
with the reference-based model than belief-based model (e.g. Ellingsen et al.
2010). The picture, therefore, is somewhat mixed.
One way to interpret these findings is to acknowledge the difficulty of
distinguishing between different models of guilt. Just about all the evidence
reviewed in this paper suggests that the belief-based model of guilt aversion
can help make valid predictions on behavior, even if it, not unsurprisingly,
does not capture everything. Moreover, there is more which unites than
divides the belief-based and reference-based models. For instance, a key point
made by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, 2010) is that feelings of guilt are
very much context dependent. This point easily translates to the reference-
based model. Support for the reference-based model could, therefore, be seen
as a critique or endorsement of the belief-based approach depending on one’s
perspective.22
Another thing to take from this review is the potential merits of a hybrid
approach that incorporates aspects from both the belief-based and reference-
based models. For instance, the belief-based model does not question whether
beliefs are ‘reasonable’. Yet, a person may feel no guilt from disappointing
unreasonable payoff expectations (Khalmetski 2016). Or they may want to
surprise someone with low expectations (Khalmetski et al. 2015). The diffi-
culty with this interpretation is that we need a working notion of reasonable
or low and that inevitable means we need to bring in some kind of reference
level. Also, the belief-based model comes into it’s own when the people in-
volved know something about each other (and so have more informed beliefs),
but we have seen that this reduced social distance brings with it complicating
22This conclusion differs from that obtained for other belief-based models, such as reci-
procity, where predictions are clearly sensitive to the model used (e.g. Falk, Fehr and
Fischbacher 2008).
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effects such as increased cooperation. Note that this is not merely to say that
belief-based guilt aversion is one of many factors that influence choice. But
more a call for the need to model the interaction between different factors.
So, what direction could future work take? Here are some suggestions of
things that could be built into or considered in experimental work.
• We need more evidence on normative beliefs and so there is merit in ask-
ing subjects for their normative beliefs alongside eliciting their second-
order beliefs. Andrighetto et al. (2015) show the way forward in this
regard. It would also be of interest to see how normative beliefs are
influenced by, say, exposure or communication. For instance, does the
‘right thing to do’ change when Brian knows that Ann will observe his
actions.
• We can elicit second-order beliefs using multiple different approaches
for the same subject. There has possibly been a reluctance to use mul-
tiple approaches to elicit the ‘same thing’. But from the perspective
of subjects things like guess-the-average, payoff-expectation and disclo-
sure approaches may feel different. Moreover, one can argue that they
measure subtly difference things. For instance, the guess-the-average
approach is about population averages while the payoff-expectation ap-
proach captures an element of uncertainty. So, there is no reason to not
obtain data using multiple approaches. This, coupled with an elicita-
tion of normative beliefs, is the simplest and most direct way of testing
Hypothesis 1. Bellemare et al. (2011, 2017) show the way forward in
this regard.
• Communication is a potential way to distinguish between models of
guilt aversion. But, it also brings along many confounding factors. To
control for that it would be beneficial to elicit second-order beliefs (and
potentially normative beliefs) before and after communication. For
instance, we could elicit Brian’s second-order beliefs using the guess-
the-average approach, allow him to send a promise to Ann, and then
remeasure beliefs. Or we could use the strategy method to see how, say,
Brian’s second-order beliefs are influenced by a promise being received
or not by Ann. This would move us away from trying to extrapolate
treatment effects from point estimates of beliefs. We also see the change
in beliefs.
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• The literature has almost exclusively focused on communication from
Brian to Ann. But communication from Ann to Brian seems equally
interesting and so this is an issue that warrants future work. Also,
a reviewer suggested that one could consider communication to Brian
from an independent third-party. This may provide a very nice of
way influencing Brian’s beliefs without the confounding problem of
communication between Ann and Brian. Again, we can measure beliefs
in multiple ways before and after communication.
• Exposure is an issue that also seems understudied. Tadelis (2011) shows
the way in comparing matched and public exposure with anonymity.
But again it would be interesting to pick apart the consequences of
exposure for beliefs, empirical expectations and normative beliefs to
then better understand why exposure matters.
• There is merit in considering the diffuseness of beliefs. The standard
model of belief-based guilt aversion assumes that higher-order moments
of beliefs do not influence guilt (Batigalli and Dufwenberg 2007). In-
tuitively, however, the more uncertainty Brian has on Ann’s beliefs,
then the less guilt he may feel (Bacharach, Guerra and Zizzo 2007).23
This can have several important implications. For instance, one effect
of communication may be to reduce uncertainty. Also, the disclosure
approach may differ from the menu approach because it reduces Brian’s
uncertainty. To capture uncertainty we need to elicit not only second-
order beliefs but uncertainty around beliefs.
• The study of Khalmetski (2016) provides a beautiful illustration of
how an exogenous shift in second-order beliefs can be induced through
a careful manipulation of treatments. The focus of that study was
on guilt from lying and so it cannot directly speak to the distinguish
between belief-based and reference-based guilt in trust games. It does,
though, show the merit of trying to induce an exogenous shift in beliefs.
A slightly bigger challenge comes with the application of guilt aversion.
Theoretical elegance suggests an equilibrium approach in which beliefs are
correct (Charness and Dufwenberg 2007, e.g. Beck et al. 2013). Reality,
however, suggests that beliefs will be noisy and that people may not fully
23This would follow from convexity of π but also may reflect less guilt if there is wiggle
room to justify actions (Dana, Weber, Kuang 2007).
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anticipate guilt when making decisions. In particular, belief-based guilt aver-
sion does not require that beliefs be correct. It merely requires that people
act on their beliefs. This muddies the waters. Suppose, for instance, as often
seems to be the case, that first-order beliefs are biased. This might lead to
unreasonable expectations and almost certainly leads to biased second-order
beliefs.
The consequences of this need to be carefully unpicked. Moreover, if guilt
is an emotion someone experiences after an event then it may be unclear how
much anticipation of guilt influences behavior (Miettinen and Suetens 2008,
Bracht and Regner 2013). This points to a need for more understanding of
how people form beliefs, how sensitive they are to guilt, and how anticipation
of guilt feeds into decisions (Bellemare et al. 2011, Bracht and Regner 2013,
Khalmetski et al. 2015 and Attanasi et al. 2016 are all important steps in
this direction). For instance, a subject may walk out of the experimental lab
feeling no guilt, talk to another subject, update his beliefs and then feel guilt
for the decisions he made in the experiment. If people are poor at predicting
(particularly in the lab) whether a choice will subsequently make them feel
guilty, choices may not capture the full extent of guilt.
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